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Arti K. Rai1 
In areas of cumulative research such as biotechnology, broad patents on 
fundamental research tools have the potential to create impediments to follow-on 
research and development.2 Impediments to R&D may also be created by a possible 
“anticommons” or “thicket” of upstream rights.3  Whether such impediments actually 
arise in any given case is of course an empirical question.  From an empirical standpoint, 
the net impact of recent increases in upstream biotechnology rights is far from clear.4  It 
is fair to say, however, that one standard market solution to rights fragmentation – the 
reduction of transaction costs through collective institutions that pool and exchange rights 
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 has not emerged.  Rather, in the commercial arena, significant transaction costs and 
licensing fees have simply become part of the cost of doing business.  Although these 
costs have probably reduced profits, foreseeable sales revenues have been sufficiently 
high that the profit incentive has not been eliminated.6   
In contrast, when follow-on research is conducted in the university context,7 or by 
non-profit institutions that target the developing world,8 foreseeable payoffs are either 
highly uncertain or are clearly small.  In these contexts, large transaction and licensing 
costs may pose a more pressing problem.  On the other hand, at least in the context of 
low-margin research, there is reason to be optimistic that the “standard” solution of 
collective rights management may actually work.  When the follow-on research in 
question is of demonstrably low commercial value, there is no reason for upstream 
rightsholders to fear that they are foregoing large downstream rents.  Thus, even though 
conditions in the biotechnology sector may, as a general matter, work against collective 
action, low-margin research may be an exception.  Non-profit institutions such as 
universities that are highly sensitive to reputational pressures, should be the easiest 
players to enlist.  Fortunately, in both agricultural and health-related biotechnology, non-
profit institutions own a significant percentage of patents. 
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 In fact, low-margin research is the area of biotechnology in which we have seen 
the most significant movement towards collective rights management.  In the area of 
agricultural biotechnology research for developing countries, a 22-university consortium 
has been established to address impediments posed by upstream rights.  Considerable 
efforts are also being made to achieve collective action in the areas of health-related 
biotechnology for developing countries.  Moreover, although universities and other non-
profit institutions are probably the most likely candidates for successful collective action, 
there may be also some possibility of involving the private sector.   
This essay proceeds in four parts.  Part I gives a brief history of recent rights 
expansion and proliferation in upstream biotechnology.  It argues that while large firms 
that conduct research in biopharmaceuticals or in agricultural biotechnology may be able 
to expend the considerable sums of money necessary to circumvent obstacles posed by 
proprietary rights, it would be irrational for researchers working on projects of uncertain 
or low commercial value to expend such resources.  This Part also gives evidence of 
situations in which upstream complexity appears to have impeded research of uncertain 
or low commercial value.  Part II discusses the likelihood of collective action, 
particularly public sector collective action, to reduce impediments to research of 
uncertain or low commercial value.  It argues that collective action in the area of low-
margin research has significant prospects for success.  Part III describes efforts by the 
public sector to secure collective rights management for humanitarian purposes in the 
area of agricultural biotechnology.  It also examines the feasibility of similar efforts 
currently under way in the area of low-margin biomedical research.  Part IV concludes by 
discussing the extent to which the private sector might need to be involved as well as 
other limitations of public sector collective action.  
I.  The Impact of Upstream Proprietary Rights  
 A.  Increases in Upstream Proprietary Rights 
 In the area of biotechnology research, both biomedical and agricultural, the last 
two decades have been characterized by a significant increase in the number of upstream 
proprietary rights.9  In the biomedical area, the increase in upstream numbers is perhaps 
best demonstrated through the patent statistics of research universities.10  While U.S. 
universities received only 264 patents annually in 1979, that number had increased to 
3,764 by 2000:11 about half of recent university patents appear to be in the biomedical 
arena.12  The number of plant biotechnology patents granted by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office has also increased substantially in the past two decades.13  
Additionally, according to patent mapping done by Geoffrey Graff and his colleagues, 
these patents appear to cover virtually all of the basic technologies necessary to conduct 
research in agricultural biotechnology.14    
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Whether claim scope has increased is less clear. Indeed, given the apparent 
hostility of at least some members of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to 
broad biotechnology patent claims,15 such claims may be suspect.  Nonetheless, some 
patents with controversially broad claims have issued in recent years.  For example, in 
June 2002, Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute received a patent on federally-
funded research involving the NF-kB cell signaling pathway.16  The patent claims all 
drugs that work by inhibiting the pathway.  Because the NF-kB pathway is a fundamental 
pathway involved in diseases ranging from cancer and osteoporosis to atherosclerosis and 
rheumatoid arthritis, the patent may cover drug treatments for all of those diseases.  
Indeed, the exclusive licensee of the NF-kB patent, Ariad Pharmaceuticals, is suing, or 
threatening to sue, dozens of companies with drug products that inhibit the pathway.17  
Another recent example of broad claiming is the University of Wisconsin’s patent on 
primate embryonic stem cells.  The 1998 patent claims all such stem cells, no matter how 
they are derived, even though, at the time of the patent application, researchers had 
succeeded in deriving the cells from rhesus monkeys and macaques only.18 
Even when a research tool is not patented, universities and private firms may 
leverage their physical control over the tangible tool into a percentage of the profits from 
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subsequent commercial products.  If the recipient of the tool is a commercial entity, the 
research tool owner may seek a reach-through royalty.  If the tool recipient is a 
university, the research tool owner may seek a reach-through license to any subsequent 
intellectual property.  An NIH working group study conducted in the late 1990s 
concluded that material transfer agreements (“MTAs”) for the transfer of tools often 
contained reach-through terms.19   
 B.  Do Upstream Proprietary Rights Impede Follow-On Research? 
At least in theory, increased proprietary activity has the potential to impede 
subsequent research.  Patent licensing entails not only supra-competitive pricing but also 
possible transaction cost problems associated with imperfect information, disparate 
assessments of value, and strategic behavior.  Where a broad patent covers a research tool 
that would from, a social welfare standpoint, be best developed through widespread 
licensing, the combination of transaction costs and high licensing fees may impede this 
social desirable result.20  In the case of multiple upstream patents (whether broad or 
narrow), transaction costs and licensing fees associated with securing freedom to operate 
may be particularly problematic.21  A market optimist might counter such theorizing by 
noting that rights owners motivated to make a profit are likely to reduce transaction costs 
by forming patent pools that allow relatively free exchange of rights.  With respect to 
licensing fees, rational, profit-maximizing rights owners are also likely to price-
discriminate in favor of resource-poor researchers.   
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For better or for worse, the issue of actual impact is very difficult to resolve in 
theory.  Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the actual impact of upstream 
biotechnology rights also fails to yield a definitive conclusion.  But it does suggest that 
neither the market optimists nor the market pessimists are entirely correct.  On the one 
hand, ongoing commercial projects do not appear to have been stopped by the inability to 
resolve concerns about upstream rights.  On the other hand, there is some evidence of 
delayed, redirected, or even diminished research in areas where significant upstream 
proprietary positions exist.22  For present purposes, perhaps the most notable empirical 
result is the dog that did not bark: commercial patent pools and similar transaction cost-
reducing institutions have not emerged.  Rather, industry actors that produce end 
products, such as pharmaceutical companies, have put information in the public domain 
for the specific purpose of thwarting the proprietary designs of upstream firms.23  To 
some extent, firms have also avoided transaction costs by simply ignoring research tool 
patents and hoping that their infringement, even if detected, is detected after the six-year 
statute of limitations has run.24  Finally, and perhaps most commonly, downstream firms 
have simply endured licensing and transaction costs that run into the millions of dollars 
as a necessary evil.25  
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In contrast, in university contexts, where the immediately foreseeable payoffs – 
commercial or academic – from research is often not high, researchers are unlikely to be 
willing or able to incur high transaction costs in order to gain access to upstream 
research.  Such costs appear to have been mounting, as academic researchers increasingly 
receive research tools under restrictive MTAs.   According to the 1999 report of an NIH 
working group on research tools, even MTAs that merely transfer tools from one 
academic researcher to another can contain reach-through claims; requirements of 
publication delay pending a determination of intellectual property rights; and prohibitions 
on transfer of the tools to other research institutions.26   
In a recent survey conducted by Eric Campbell and his colleagues, 47% of 
academic geneticists who had, within the previous three years, made requests for 
additional data or materials relating to research published by other academics reported 
that they were ultimately unable to secure access to such data or materials.27  This 47% 
figure represents a substantial increase over the 34% figure reported in a prior survey 
conducted by the same authors in the mid 1990s.  To some extent, these denials had to do 
with factors unrelated to proprietary rights, such as scientific competition.28  However, 
the multivariate regression analysis performed by the authors of the survey indicated that 
denials were also independently associated with the need to honor the requirements of an 
industrial sponsor or the need to protect the commercial value of results.  Moreover, the 
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primary reason given by respondents who acknowledged denying requests for data or 
materials was the cost associated with such transfer.29  Although not limited to such 
costs,30 these costs likely include difficulties associated with complex negotiations over 
MTAs.  Indeed, the survey authors specifically point to the complexity and restrictiveness 
of MTAs as creating impediments to sharing.31  
As a consequence of these withholding behaviors, 28% of the respondents to the 
Campbell survey reported that they were unable to confirm the published results and 21% 
abandoned a promising line of research.  One might reasonably hypothesize that the 
research in question that did not go forward because of access denials had uncertain 
commercial or academic payoff, as least as compared to ongoing industry research.     
 With respect to patented materials to which they do not need physical access, 
there is evidence that academics reduce licensing and transaction costs by simply 
ignoring the patents.32  Thus far, this “self-help” approach has enjoyed some success.  
Patentees have tended not to sue academics for their infringing uses, either because they 
are not aware of such uses or because (as market optimists might predict) refraining from 
such suits constitutes an informal regime of price discrimination in favor of cash-strapped 
researchers.  This situation may be unstable, however.  As universities are increasingly 
seen, particularly by the courts, as ordinary commercial players from whom damages can 
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be extracted,33 barriers to suit may diminish.  In the context of patented genetic diagnostic 
tests, for example, various industry players have already threatened to sue researchers, 
with the result, well-documented in empirical research by Jon Merz and Mildred Cho 
among others, that many academic diagnostic labs have stopped performing such 
testing.34  Although the issue of diagnostic testing is complicated by the reality that it 
constitutes both research and a commercial service provided to patients, the impasse in 
this area suggests that, in the future, price discrimination may not work as a mechanism 
for mediating the tension between the supra-competitive pricing allowed by proprietary 
rights and the limited budgets of most academic labs.   
Similarly, in the context of research that is demonstrably of low commercial 
value, there is evidence that upstream proprietary rights have impeded downstream 
research.   Consider the case of research into a malaria vaccine.  The disease burden 
associated with malaria is very significant, on the order of over one million deaths a year.  
The social value of a malaria vaccine would therefore be quite high.  Nonetheless, 
because the primary market for such a vaccine would be in the developing world, such 
research is of low commercial value.  Moreover, the Malaria Vaccine Institute (“MVI”), 
the major philanthropic organization that is supporting research into a malaria vaccine, 
argues that upstream patent rights are an important factor in chilling vaccine R&D.  
Specifically, according to a patent analysis commissioned by the MVI, the patent 
landscape surrounding just one antigen likely to be relevant to any vaccine that is 
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ultimately developed is quite complex.  As many as 34 different sets of patents describe 
and claim the antigen, MSP-1, or the production and delivery thereof.35    
 In the area of agricultural biotechnology, there is perhaps even more compelling 
evidence that research projects of low commercial value have been significantly delayed, 
or have not gone forward at all, because of upstream patent rights.  Specifically, restricted 
access to patented technologies has been identified as a significant barrier to development 
of subsistence crops relevant to the developing world.36  A prominent example of 
upstream patent rights that have hindered creation of transgenic crops suited for 
subsistence farmers in developing countries are patents on two fundamental “enabling” 
technologies for inserting foreign genes into crops.  The first of these patents issued to 
Cornell University in July 1990 and is licensed exclusively to Dupont.37 The second of 
these patents issued to Washington University in April 2000 and is licensed exclusively 
to Ciba-Geigy (now Syngenta).38   The private sector licensees of these patents have 
conducted -- and sublicensed others to conduct -- transgenic crop research relevant to the 
developed world.   More generally, through a strategic combination of research, 
licensing, and merger activity, large agricultural biotechnology companies have 
assembled the intellectual property necessary to produce new crops of interest to the 
developed world.39  These companies have not, however, thus far shown interest in 
innovative research relevant to the developing world.  The presence of proprietary rights 
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has also hindered public sector efforts at humanitarian research.40  Similarly, private 
sector proprietary positions have hindered public sector efforts at conventional plant 
breeding directed to the needs of the developing world.41 
In the context of research of uncertain or low commercial value, then, there is 
substantial reason to be concerned about upstream proprietary rights.  One question that 
might reasonably be asked in these contexts, however, is whether collective action to 
reduce at least transaction costs – and perhaps even actual licensing costs – is likely to be 
more successful in the context of uncertain or low margin research than it has been in the 
context of high-margin research.  The next Part considers the conditions under which we 
are most likely to see collective rights management that reduces licensing and transaction 
costs.    
II.  The Prospect of Collective Action   
 
As institutional economists have frequently noted, securing collective action can 
be very difficult, particularly if the collective action requires sacrificing short-term gain.  
Success is most likely when the parties involved have shared values and interests; their 
numbers are relatively small; and they engage in repeated, readily observable 
interactions.42  Given such preconditions, norms of behavior can develop and departures 
from these norms can be sanctioned through mechanisms such as shaming or exclusion.  
Absent such preconditions, there is a tendency to defect and attempt to maximize one’s 
individual gain at the expense of the collective.  Moreover, where the collective action 
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involves pooling proprietary rights in some fashion, there generally needs to be some 
agreement on the value of the individual proprietary rights.43 
The institutional economists’ assumption that only relatively small, close-knit 
groups can produce successful collective action has recently been challenged by growth 
in open source software and other Internet-based cooperative projects.  Participants in the 
development of open-source software are often relative strangers to each other.  
Nonetheless, they agree to work on software projects for which they will secure neither 
monetary reimbursement nor the usual sort of exclusive proprietary rights.44   More 
generally, the transaction-cost lowering effect of the Internet has allowed the emergence 
of a new production mode in which large numbers of relative strangers volunteer to work 
together on collective projects.45  Because the informational inputs of large numbers of 
individuals can be readily evaluated and integrated, reward mechanisms such as prestige 
or reputation that previously worked only in smaller groups can be extended more 
broadly.  Such open source/commons-based production requires, however, not only low 
transaction costs but also low capital costs.  In other words, volunteers must not be forced 
to invest resources other than time.  In the area of “wet lab” biotechnology research, by 
contrast, large capital cost investments are still necessary.46     
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Barriers to collective action are likely to be particularly high when wet lab 
research has high commercial value.  In this context, the players involved – small 
biotechnology companies, large agribusiness and pharmaceutical companies, not to 
mention universities and federal funding agencies – have asymmetric motivations and 
interests.  While firms that make profits from end product patents might be able to reach 
agreement on licensing basic inventions widely on a low or no-royalty basis, firms (and 
universities for that matter) that focus exclusively on upstream research might believe in 
licensing more selectively at a higher royalty.47  The bargaining difficulties created by 
asymmetric interests are only exacerbated when parties hold asymmetric rights – that is, 
if one party holds a broad foundational patent while other parties have narrower 
improvement patents.  Compound these tactical asymmetries with informational deficits 
regarding valuation, and it is hardly surprising that we have not seen much movement 
towards collective rights management.    
With respect to research of uncertain commercial value, the prospects for 
collective action should be higher.  As an initial matter, for at least some of this research, 
the central players – primarily universities and other non-profit institutions – are more 
homogeneous.  In addition, by definition, the likelihood of gain from strategic behavior is 
lower than in the context of high-margin research.  Indeed, we have seen some evidence 
of collective self-restraint on the part of universities.  For example, in the context of the 
Human Genome Project, academic scientists, working with the National Institutes of 
Health (“NIH”), achieved an approximation of university-level collective action by 
appealing to traditional scientific norms of open access: once the genome scientists had 
agreed not to seek proprietary rights in raw human genome sequence data, these scientists 
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also managed to convince their respective institutions to go along with their agreement 
(the so-called “Bermuda principles”).48 
It is important to emphasize, however, that the collective action in this case was 
instigated by a tightly knit group of influential scientists who adhered to communal views 
of science, backed by the institutional weight of the National Institutes of Health 
(“NIH”), and more or less foisted on the scientists’ respective universities.  Without these 
preconditions, collective action at the university level may be difficult to achieve.  The 
available empirical evidence indicates that, unlike the scientists who worked on the 
Human Genome Project, university technology transfer are often evaluated on the basis 
of, and motivated in significant part by, the desire to increase licensing revenue.49  
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, agreements to secure collective action that have not been 
led by scientists have been less than successful.  Consider the case of the Uniform 
Biological Materials Transfer Agreement (“UBMTA”).  In this voluntary agreement, 
reached in 1995 between university technology transfer officers from more than 100 
institutions, the officers committed themselves to making unpatented biological materials 
freely available within the academic sector for research purposes.  Compliance with this 
standard form MTA does not appear to have been uniform: as noted earlier, an NIH 
working group found that, at least in the late 1990s, many transfers of research tools 
between universities contained onerous restrictions.   
   In the case of transfer of research tools between universities, however, we are 
dealing in most cases with research of uncertain rather than demonstrably low value.  By 
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definition, this uncertainty means that some of the materials may ultimately yield some 
profit.  Failure to include proprietary restrictions in an MTA means the loss of these 
potential profits.  As a consequence, university technology transfer offices (“TTOs”) who 
are highly averse to losing revenue opportunities may be reluctant to approve free 
distribution.  Risk-aversion may be particular high for university technology transfer 
officers who are less sophisticated, are under pressure to increase licensing revenues, 
and/or have unrealistic expectations of profitability.50   
Because of the distinction between research of uncertain and low value, the less 
than complete success of the UBMTA does not necessarily bode ill for efforts at 
university collective action in the humanitarian context. While universities and 
technology transfer officers may be uncomfortable about foregoing an uncertain, but 
potentially large, revenue stream, they should be less concerned about relinquishing 
monetary gains from licensing directed towards developing country research.  In the 
latter case, the value of the revenue stream foregone is unequivocally quite modest.  The 
possibility of significant reputational benefit at modest financial cost should also make 
collective action enticing for universities and other non-profit institutions. 
III.  Public Sector Efforts at Collective Action 
 Given this backdrop, it is not surprising that public sector institutions have 
launched significant efforts to manage proprietary rights in a manner that benefits the 
developing world.  Roger N. Beachy, president of the Donald Danforth Plant Science 
Center in St. Louis, Missouri, recently authored an editorial in Science noting that, at his 
Center, all research and licensing agreements alert parties that the Center will preserve 
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the availability of intellectual property rights for meeting the needs of developing 
countries.51  Beachy argues that the experience of the Danforth Center over the past three 
years has been that private sector companies have been willing to accept such restrictions 
on licensing.  He urges all academic and non-profit research institutions to include such 
terms in their licensing agreements.  As he points out, “[a]lthough there may be a modest 
financial cost of taking such a position, the potential benefits in terms of regaining public 
trust, and ultimately of deploying technologies where they may be needed most, far 
outweigh the financial or opportunity costs.”   
Indeed, 21 non-profit institutions with heavy research agendas in agriculture, as 
well as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, have now joined together to heed Dr. 
Beachy’s call.  They have publicly committed themselves to articulating “best practices” 
that include the possibility of systematically retaining rights so as to allow public sector 
researchers freedom to operate in the context of developing-world-oriented research.52  
The collective institutional framework within which these best practices will be 
articulated is the newly established Public-Sector Intellectual Property Resource for 
Agriculture (“PIPRA”).53  PIPRA will also be responsible for studying the possibility of 
pooling complementary technologies held by the public sector and making these 
technology “packages” available at a low royalty for agricultural research applications in 
the public sector and in developing countries.54  Finally, PIPRA will assist in developing 
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a collective public sector IP asset database that will supplement existing efforts to inform 
researchers about freedom to operate obstacles.55 
Proliferating proprietary rights have impeded developing country-oriented 
research not only into transgenic crops but also into new techniques of conventional 
breeding.56  One recent collective effort to address this problem involves a consortium of 
researchers at twelve institutions that is making publicly available molecular biology 
techniques that will assist in conventional breeding of wheat.  The primary technique is 
“market assisted selection” or MAS.  While conventional breeding has traditionally relied 
on visible traits to select improved varieties – a procedure that often requires waiting 
many generations – MAS looks for markers that are inherited along with the desired trait.  
MAS thus allows plants that carry the trait to be picked out quickly.  The consortium 
website contains research protocols and marker sequences that researchers all over the 
world can freely access and use.57 
 Notably, collective action by universities and other non-profit institutions – even 
without the participation of the private sector – has the potential to be quite effective.  In 
the area of agricultural technologies, the public sector owns 24% of plant biotechnology 
patents granted in the U.S. between 1982 and 2001.  Many of these patents cover 
fundamental research tools that are essential for future research.58  Although some 
publicly-owned patents – such as methods for gene transfer – have unfortunately already 
been licensed exclusively to the private sector, licensing of enabling technologies on 
which the public sector is currently working, such as selectable markers, could be done 
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under the best practices articulated by PIPRA.  Even with respect to patents that have 
already been licensed exclusively, public sector ownership could conceivably confer 
some leverage.  At a minimum, useful collective efforts could be made towards making 
transparent the licensing status of technologies owned by the public sector. 
In the biomedical arena, the public sector presence is also quite significant.  In the 
genomics area, for example, 42% of patents are owned by either universities, nonprofit 
research institutes, or the U.S. government.59  Various efforts at public sector collective 
action for humanitarian purposes are also beginning to take shape.  For example, the 
London-based Centre for the Management of Intellectual Property in Health Research 
and Development (“MIHR”), an organization set up in 2002 to improve access to health 
products in developing countries, has devoted significant energy to developing a best 
practices handbook on intellectual property management.60  Some of these best practices 
relate to licensing schemes that universities can use to ensure their technology transfer 
benefits developing countries.  For example, Lita Nelsen, head of the MIT Office of 
Technology Transfer and MIHR advisor, suggests that universities might prohibit 
licensees from filing developing country patents on research tools that can be used 
without further development.61  Nelsen also suggests that, with respect to patents on end 
product drugs that have significant first world markets, universities might prohibit 
licensees from filing patents in developing countries.  A newly formed coalition called 
Universities Allied for Essential Medicine (“UAEM”) has gone several steps further in 
terms of its suggestions for robust collective action to develop a public domain for 
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developing country research and drug distribution.  Under the UAEM proposal, 
university research tool licenses would specifically preserve open access for entities that 
wanted to use the tools to do research on diseases that primarily afflict developing 
countries (and hence tend to be neglected by the commercial sector).  Any entity that 
wanted to do so such research would simply notify the university of its intent.62  The 
UAEM approach would also require licensees to grant back any improvement patents so 
that these patents would be available for open use in neglected disease research.     
To be sure, efforts in health-related biotechnology as not as advanced as in the 
agricultural sector: neither MIHR nor UAEM has thus far enlisted the public support of 
significant numbers of universities.  Indeed, some have suggested that licensees might not 
sign on to a grant back approach of the sort suggested by UAEM.63  Nonetheless, more so 
than with high-commercial value research, or even research of uncertain commercial 
value, it should be possible to achieve some collective agreement. The success of one 
initiative in the AIDS vaccine arena, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (“IAVI”), 
suggests that some type of collective action might be possible.  IAVI funds research and 
development on AIDS vaccine candidates for the developing world.  Specifically, IAVI 
focuses on HIV-1 subtypes C and A, which are the major subtypes of HIV-1 prevalent in 
sub-Saharan Africa, India, and China.  In contrast, HIV-1 subtype B , on which most 
vaccine research to date has focused, is prevalent in North America and Europe.  
Organizations that receive such funding (including, to date, Oxford University, the 
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Imperial College of Science and Technology, and the Aaron Diamond AIDS Research 
Center) must agree, as a condition of such funding, to make any vaccine that is developed 
available at a “reasonable price” in the developing world.64  Reasonable price includes 
actual costs of production, as well as a profit margin, but does not include R&D.  To the 
extent that a given organization does not succeed in developing and manufacturing a 
vaccine, it must give IAVI royalty-free rights to practice any patent it has in the area of 
vaccine research.65  That public sector organizations would agree to relinquish control 
over patent rights relevant to the developing world suggests that collective management 
of university rights in a manner helpful to the developing world is realistic.   
V.  Limitations of Public Sector Collective Action 
Reliance on voluntary collective action by public sector institutions to address the 
needs of developing countries has limitations.  As an initial matter, public sector 
institutions own only a portion of the relevant intellectual property.  Even in the area of 
agricultural biotechnology, which has long been dominated by public sector research, 
only about one-quarter of patents are held by the public sector.  In addition, critical public 
sector patents – such as the technology for inserting new genes into plants – are 
effectively owned by the private sector in that they have been licensed exclusively to 
private firms with no reservation of rights.  Hence the role of the private sector merits 
discussion. 
A.  The Role of the Private Sector   
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Where research and development involves proprietary rights held by private 
sector institutions, addressing the obstacles posed by such rights will be more difficult.  
Nonetheless, the public sector may be able to catalyze collective action across the public-
private divide.  As in the public sector (though perhaps not to the same extent), the 
modest revenue streams foregone, combined with positive reputational effects, should 
make collective action more likely.  For example, transgenic B-carotene-enhanced rice 
(so-called “Golden Rice”), which could alleviate vitamin-A deficiency suffered by as 
many as 400 million individuals in the developing world, was created by Ingo Potrykus 
and his colleagues at the publicly-funded Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in 
Zurich.  But producing this rice for the developing world involved overcoming the 
barriers posed more than 70 patented or proprietary methods and materials belonging to 
32 different companies.  After substantial effort by the public sector, including significant 
personal negotiation by Ingo Potrykus himself, agreements were reached that allowed 
public sector scientists to proceed with research to develop lines of golden rice without 
paying licensing fees.  In particular, Potrykus and his public sector allies were able to 
persuade a number of major companies, including Monsanto, Sygenta, and Bayer, to 
donate their proprietary technologies for production of B-carotene-enhanced rice in the 
developing world.66   
With respect to research focused on developing country diseases, IAVI has had 
some success in enlisting the private sector on the same terms as it has enlisted the public 
sector.  Currently, it has three private sector collaborators.  More generally, the 
development of therapies to treat developing country diseases will likely be assisted by 
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access to small molecule chemical libraries.67  These libraries are generally held as trade 
secrets by pharmaceutical companies.  If pharmaceutical companies could be assured that 
use of their libraries would be restricted to developing country diseases, they might be 
willing to donate their libraries for research on those diseases.  Even where public sector 
action does not catalyze donation of proprietary technologies for the developing world, it 
might help to produce intellectual property clearinghouses where rights to such 
technology would be available at relatively low cost.68   
B .  Obstacles Unrelated to Intellectual Property 
 Another important set of objections to reliance on voluntary collective action 
revolves around the reality that intellectual property rights represent only a part of the 
problem in terms of generating R&D oriented towards the developing world.  Perhaps 
most obviously, once upstream intellectual property hurdles are overcome, public sector 
funding will be necessary to pay for the large capital and labor costs of research and 
development.69  These R&D costs are likely to be particularly high in the area of 
biomedical research.  For example, although IAVI has cash reserves of approximately 
$250 million, this is only about half of the sum the organization says it needs to execute 
its plans.70  In contrast, in the year 2000, the pharmaceutical company Merck devoted 
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$2.4 billion to developing an AIDS vaccine for the developed world.71  Nonetheless, even 
if upstream proprietary rights represent only a small portion of the problem with respect 
to producing biotechnological products for the developing world, collective action can 
and should work to ensure that such rights do not pose an obstacle. 
Conclusion 
 Private sector collective action that facilitates free rights exchange is often 
proposed as an efficient solution to difficulties created by increasing proprietary 
complexity in the research arena.  This paper has argued that, at least in the area of 
biotechnology, we have not seen such activity, and we should not be surprised by its 
absence.  What we should expect, and what has in fact arisen, is public sector collective 
action in research areas of low commercial value.  Although such public sector collective 
action has many limitations, it is a valuable first step towards generating research that 
addresses the health problems and food security needs of developing countries.    
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